Can Marton Coding Alone Ensure Individual Secrecy? by Tan, Jin Yeong et al.
Can Marton Coding Alone Ensure Individual
Secrecy?
Jin Yeong Tan, Lawrence Ong, and Behzad Asadi
School of Electrical Engineering and Computing, The University of Newcastle, Newcastle, Australia
Email: jinyeong.tan@uon.edu.au, lawrence.ong@newcastle.edu.au, behzad.asadi@uon.edu.au
Abstract—For communications in the presence of eavesdrop-
pers, random components are often used in code design to
camouflage information from eavesdroppers. In broadcast chan-
nels without eavesdroppers, Marton coding comprises random
components which allow correlation between auxiliary random
variables representing independent messages. In this paper, we
study if Marton coding alone can ensure individual secrecy in
the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with a
passive eavesdropper. Our results show that this is possible and
Marton coding guarantees individual secrecy in accordance to
the principle of Wyner secrecy coding. However, this comes with
a penalty of requiring stricter channel conditions.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel, individual secrecy, Marton
coding, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The problem of secure communication over broadcast chan-
nels is always of great importance since broadcast channels
are widely applied in communication systems. Some popular
works on secure broadcast channel have been presented by
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [1], Chia and El Gamal [2] as well
as Schaefer and Boche [3]. These works [1]–[3] studied
cases of two- or three-receiver broadcast channel in which a
common message is transmitted to all receivers and a private
message is protected from a certain number of receivers using
Wyner secrecy coding [4]. The complexity of the problem
also increases as we consider the protection of two private
messages from an eavesdropper. In this case, Chen, Koyluoglu
and Sezgin [5] proposed a secrecy coding scheme which
combines Wyner secrecy coding [4] and Carleial-Hellman
secrecy coding [6]; whereas Mansour, Schaefer and Boche [7]
proposed a secrecy coding scheme which combines Wyner
secrecy coding [4] and one-time pad [8]. The works discussed
above were also extended to more specific broadcast channels
with channel states. For instance, several studies looked into
secure communications in broadcast channels with receiver
side information at the legitimate receivers which is unknown
to the eavesdropper [9]–[13].
From the works discussed above, one can easily notice
that regardless of the channel setup, it seems to be a norm
for secure broadcasting to be achieved by integrating secrecy
techniques into error-correcting coding schemes. Among the
secrecy techniques covered in these works are the secret key
approach (also known as one-time pad) [8], Wyner secrecy
coding [4] and Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [6]. When
secure broadcasting is necessary, these secrecy techniques are
often integrated independently or as a combination to common
error-correcting coding scheme for broadcast channels such
as the superposition coding scheme [14] and Marton coding
scheme [15]. As a consequence of this common practice, there
is little knowledge on whether secure broadcasting can be
achieved by having only an error-correcting coding scheme.
In regards to this, we have only come across some brief
insights in two works. Although two distinct secrecy coding
schemes have been proposed by Chen, Koyluoglu and Sezgin
[5] and Mansour, Schaefer and Boche [7] for the two-receiver
discrete memoryless broadcast channel with a passive eaves-
dropper, both schemes presented the possibility of using error-
correcting coding schemes to ensure secrecy. In particular, the
random components in Marton coding were utilized to help
in message protection. However, this protection can only be
achieved when the random components in Marton coding are
complemented with other secrecy techniques.
This motivates us to explore if the dependence on additional
secrecy techniques in secrecy coding scheme construction can
be removed and if it is possible to use the randomness in
Marton coding alone to provide secure communication. It
is interesting to see how the Marton coding scheme alone
extends itself into the area of secure broadcasting and per-
haps leads us to new ways of constructing secrecy coding
schemes. Throughout this paper, we will also be considering
the individual secrecy notion which requires the individual
information leakage from each message to the eavesdropper
to be vanishing [5], [9], [11], [16]. In short, this paper aims
to study if Marton coding alone can ensure individual secrecy
and derive the corresponding individual secrecy rate region for
the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with
a passive eavesdropper.
B. Contributions
Since the usage of only error-correcting coding schemes to
ensure secure communication has yet been attempted across
any literature in our knowledge, it is necessary for us to
identify a proper starting point to our work. We notice that
having random components, the Marton coding scheme [15]
appears to share structural similarities with the Wyner secrecy
coding scheme [4]. Since Wyner secrecy coding is a popular
secrecy coding technique that has been widely applied to
provide information protection, we draw the hypothesis that
Marton coding alone should somehow be able to guarantee
secrecy as well. In this paper, we prove that the Marton
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Fig. 1. The two-receiver broadcast channel in the presence of an eavesdropper.
coding scheme alone can provide message protection under
the notion of individual secrecy. This is possible when certain
channel constraints are satisfied during codebook generation.
Using this strategy, we derive an inner bound for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with a pas-
sive eavesdropper. The ability of Marton coding in ensuring
secure communication without the need of additional secrecy
techniques is a great observation since it may lead to the
construction of simpler and more effective secrecy coding
schemes in future works.
C. Paper Organization
The entire paper will be organized as follows. Section II will
focus on the system model. Section III will provide the main
results on using Marton coding to ensure individual secrecy.
Next, section IV will present some discussions and conclude
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we will denote random variables by uppercase
letters, their corresponding realizations by lowercase letters
and their corresponding sets by calligraphic letters. A n-
sequence of random variables will be denoted by Xn =
(X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi represents the ith variable in the
sequence. Rd represents the d-dimensional real Euclidean
space and Rd+ represents the d-dimensional non-negative real
Euclidean space. R will be used to represent a subset of
Rd. T n represents the set of jointly -typical n-sequences.
Meanwhile, [a : b] refers to a set of natural numbers between
and including a and b, for a ≤ b. Lastly, the operator× denotes
the Cartesian product.
The paper focuses on the two-receiver discrete memoryless
broadcast channel with a passive eavesdropper. The system
model for this case is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model, we
define (M1,M2) as the source messages, Mi as the message
requested by legitimate receiver i, for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let X
denote the channel input from the sender, while Yi and Z
denote the channel output to receiver i and the eavesdropper
respectively. In n channel uses, Xn represents the transmitted
codeword, Y ni represents the signal received by legitimate
receiver i and Zn represents the signal received by the
eavesdropper. The memoryless (and without feedback) nature
of the channel also implies that
p(yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, y2i, zi|xi). (1)
In this case, the transmitter will be sending messages M1
and M2 to legitimate receiver 1 and 2, respectively through
m1
{
{ {m2
nR1
nR2 nRl2
un1(m1, l1) :
un2(m2, l2) :
l1
{nRl1
l2
{
Arbitrarily
dependent
(a) Marton coding scheme
m1
{nR1
un1(m1, d1) : d1
{nRd1
(b) Wyner secrecy coding scheme
Fig. 2. Comparison between Marton coding scheme and Wyner secrecy
coding scheme.
the channel p(y1, y2, z|x). Besides, both messages M1 and M2
need to be individually protected from the eavesdropper.
Definition 1: A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) secrecy code for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel consists of:
• two message sets, where M1 = [1 : 2nR1 ] and M2 =
[1 : 2nR2 ];
• an encoding function, f : M1 ×M2 → Xn, such that
Xn = f(M1,M2); and
• two decoding functions, where g1 : Yn1 →M1, such that
Mˆ1 = g1(Y
n
1 ) at receiver 1 and g2 : Yn2 → M2, such
that Mˆ2 = g2(Y n2 ) at receiver 2.
Both messages, M1 and M2 are assumed to be uniformly
distributed over their respective message set. Hence, we have
Ri =
1
nH(Mi), for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Meanwhile the individual
information leakage rate associated with the (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n)
secrecy code is defined as R(n)L,i =
1
nI(Mi;Z
n), for all i ∈
{1, 2}.
The probability of error for the secrecy code at each receiver
i is defined as P (n)e,i = P{Mˆi 6= Mi}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. A rate
pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes such that
P
(n)
e,i ≤ n, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
R
(n)
L,i ≤ τn, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0 (4)
III. BRIDGING MARTON CODING AND WYNER SECRECY
CODING
In this section, we will establish a connection between
Marton coding [15] and Wyner secrecy coding [4]. More
precisely, we will show that Marton coding alone can provide
message protection under certain channel conditions even
without additional secrecy techniques.
Prior to our actual discussion, we will review the Marton
coding scheme [15] and the Wyner secrecy coding scheme [4]
which are illustrated in Fig. 2. The Marton coding scheme is
used while transmitting messages to multiple receivers through
the broadcast channel. Considering the two-receiver broadcast
channel whereby the transmitter sends M1 and M2 to receiver
1 and 2 respectively, we see from Fig. 2a that the Marton
coding scheme comprises two codeword layers Un1 and U
n
2
which carry M1 and M2 respectively. The codeword layers
C1(1)
un1(m1, l1)
C1(2
nR1)
1 2nRl1 2n(R1+Rl1)
C2(1)
C2(2
nR2)
1
2nRl2
2n(R2+Rl2)
un2(m2, l2)
Jointly typical
sequence pairs
(a) Codebook of the Marton coding scheme
Ci(1)
uni (mi, di)
Ci(2
nRi)
1 2nRdi 2n(Ri+Rdi)
(b) Codebook of the Wyner secrecy coding scheme
Fig. 3. Codebook comparison between the Marton coding scheme and the
Wyner secrecy coding scheme.
also contain the random components L1 and L2 in order to
allow Un1 and U
n
2 to be arbitrarily dependent while M1 and
M2 are independent.
Meanwhile, the Wyner secrecy coding scheme is used to
transmit a message to a single receiver through the wiretap
channel in which the message needs to be kept protected
from an eavesdropper. As in Fig. 2b, the Wyner secrecy
coding scheme comprises the codeword layer Un1 which carry
M1. The Wyner random component D1 is required to ensure
that the eavesdropper gains almost no information about the
message sent [4].
Our idea to establish a connection between Marton coding
and Wyner secrecy coding originates from a simple observa-
tion that both schemes share structural similarities. Notice that
both schemes transmit the desired message to the receivers via
their respective codewords. Besides, the random components
in Marton coding L1 and L2 also share similarties with
the Wyner random component D1 since they are formed
by generating additional sequences for each message. These
similarities thus beg the question: If the Wyner secrecy coding
scheme is capable of ensuring secrecy, shouldn’t the same
apply to the Marton coding scheme?
The answer to this question is not as straightforward as
it seems. Although both schemes have similar structures,
there is a slight difference during codebook generation which
consequently affects the encoding. Applying Wyner secrecy
coding to the broadcast channel [1], as seen in Fig. 3b, we
will be generating a subcodebook Ci(mi) for each message
mi, i = 1, 2. Each subcodebook consists of 2nRdi randomly
and independently generated sequences uni (mi, di), (mi, di) ∈
[1 : 2nRi ] × [1 : 2nRdi ]. This codebook will then be revealed
to all parties.
On the other hand, as seen in Fig. 3a, the Marton coding
scheme [15] undergoes similar codebook generation steps,
resulting in subcodebooks which consist of 2nRli randomly
and independently generated sequences uni (mi, li), (mi, li) ∈
[1 : 2nRi ] × [1 : 2nRli ]. The difference sets in when the
Marton coding scheme requires the Un1 and U
n
2 codeword
layers to be dependent according to some chosen joint dis-
tribution pU1U2 . This can only be achieved if at least one
jointly typical sequence pair (un1 (m1, l1), u
n
2 (m2, l2)) ∈ T n′
is present in each product subcodebook C1(m1) × C2(m2)
and is preselected for transmission. The codebook together
with all preselected jointly typical sequence pairs will then be
revealed to all parties.
The difference above directly impacts the encoding stage.
For this discussion, we assume that M1 = 1 is sent and
consider only the subcodebook C1(1). We will also assume
2nRd1 = 2nRl1 . As illustrated in Fig. 4b, to transmit the
message, Wyner secrecy coding [4] allows the encoder to
randomly choose one of the 2nRl1un1 (1, l1) sequences in the
subcodebook C1(1). The large number of remaining un1 (1, l1)
sequences can then act as random components to confuse the
eavesdropper. This is the essence behind ensuring message
protection Wyner secrecy coding.
In Marton coding [15], the encoder does not enjoy the same
freedom in sequence selection which is observed in Wyner
secrecy coding [4]. For instance, assume that we also fix M2 =
1, from subcodebook C1(1), the encoder can only choose the
un1 (1, l1) sequence which is jointly typical with u
n
2 (1, l2). For
ease of discussion, we let the sequence be un1 (1, 1).
In order for Marton coding [15] to achieve message pro-
tection in the same manner as Wyner secrecy coding [4],
we need to ensure that aside from the sequence un1 (1, 1), we
still have additional un1 (1, l1), l1 6= 1, sequences that can act
as random components to confuse the eavesdropper. This is
possible if upon considering C1(1) across all C2(m2), we
have a large number of or ideally 2nRl1 distinct un1 (1, l1)
sequences that form preselected jointly typical sequence pairs
with un2 (m2, l2). A sample of this scenario is illustrated in
Fig. 4a.
As a continuity of the idea, if we aim to bridge Marton{
C1(1)
≤ 2nRl1 (fixed) un1(1, l1)
sequences jointly
typical with un2(m2, l2)
(a) Subcodebook C1(1) of the Marton coding scheme{
C1(1)
un1(1, l1) sequences
2nRl1 (free)
(b) Subcodebook C1(1) of the Wyner secrecy coding scheme
Fig. 4. Single subcodebook comparison between the Marton coding scheme
and the Wyner secrecy coding scheme.
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Fig. 5. Problem model and its equivalent ball placement experiment.
coding [15] and Wyner secrecy coding [4], the following
questions need to be answer: Considering each subcodebooks
Ci(mi), i ∈ 1, 2, in n channel uses, how many number of
distinct uni (mi, li) sequences form preselected jointly typical
sequence pairs? Are their numbers sufficiently large in order
for the uni (mi, li) sequences to act as random components?
If not, do we have any condition that helps us achieve this
requirement?
Since the subcodebooks Ci(mi) are randomly and indepen-
dently generated for each message mi, i = 1, 2, the selections
of jointly typical sequence pairs are independent for each
product subcodebook C1(m1)×C2(m2). Thus, it is sufficient
for us to consider a single C1 subcodebook. The analysis will
apply to all remaining C1 and C2 subcodebooks as well.
Our problem model is illustrated in the left of Fig. 5.
This is part of the Marton coding codebook in Fig. 3a after
preselecting the jointly typical sequence pairs. In this case,
we consider the C1(1) subcodebook across all 2nR2 C2(m2)
subcodebooks. Note that each product subcodebook C1(1) ×
C2(m2) contains one preselected jointly typical sequence pair
as required by Marton coding. Our goal here is to calculate the
expected value of the number of distinct un1 (1, l1) sequences
that form preselected jointly typical sequence pairs. Ideally, we
want the expected value to be as large as possible as n→∞.
Upon calculating the expected value, we will be finding the
variance in order to ensure that the number of distinct un1 (1, l1)
sequences stays close to the expected value as n→∞.
In order to proceed with our calculation, we need to know
the probability of each un1 (1, l1) sequence being selected to
form a jointly typical sequence pair in each C1(1)×C2(m2).
This can be found with the aid of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Define the subcodebooks Ci(mi) to consist of
2nRli randomly and independently generated uni sequences,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. In each product subcodebook C1(m1) ×
C2(m2), the probability of selecting a jointly typical sequence
pair (un1 , u
n
2 ) is equal across all 2
n(Rl1+Rl2) possible sequence
pairs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Please refer to the extended version
of this paper [17, Appendix A] for the complete proof.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, it is also equiprobable for
each un1 (1, l1) sequence to be selected to form a jointly typical
sequence pair in each C1(1)× C2(m2).
Due to this uniformity, our problem model can be simplified
into the ball placement experiment illustrated in the right of
Fig. 5. Defining each un1 (1, l1) position across all C2(m2) as a
single bin S(l1), each product subcodebook C1(1)×C2(m2)
is now equivalent to a collection of t = 2nRl1 S(l1) bins.
The experiment then involves placing a ball randomly and
uniformly into one of the S(l1) bins. This process will be
repeated independently for s = 2nR2 times. We will use
this experiment to calculate the mean and variance of the
number of distinct S(l1) bins which contain at least one ball
as presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The number of distinct S(l1) bins containing
at least one ball after s selections from t S(l1) bins has an
expected value of
t
[
1−
(
1− 1
t
)s]
, (5)
and a variance of
t
(
1− 1
t
)s
+ t2
(
1− 1
t
)(
1− 2
t
)s
− t2
(
1− 1
t
)2s
. (6)
Proof of Lemma 2: Please refer to the extended version
of this paper [17, Appendix B] for the complete proof.
Upon finding the expected value and variance in Lemma 2,
we can proceed to our main goal: to show the number of
distinct uni (mi, li) sequences that form preselected jointly
typical sequence pairs in each subcodebook Ci(mi) in n
channel uses, for all i ∈ {1, 2}. This series of calculations
leads to Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: If
R1 > Rl2 and R2 > Rl1, (7)
then in each message subcodebook Ci(mi), for all i ∈ {1, 2},
the number of distinct uni (mi, li) sequences that form pre-
selected jointly typical sequence pairs tends to 2nRli , with
probability tending to one, as n→∞.
Sketch of proof for Theorem 1: We present a sketch of
proof here. Please refer to the extended version of this paper
[17, Appendix C] for the complete proof. In order for Marton
coding to ensure individual secrecy, we need the scheme
to perform in the same manner as Wyner secrecy coding.
Thus, considering the number of distinct uni (mi, li) sequences
that form preselected jointly typical sequence pairs, we need
the expected value to grow exponentially large as n → ∞.
Besides, we need to ensure that each realization tends to this
value, with probability tending to one, as n→∞. And these
conditions can be met by imposing the constraints in (7).
With Theorem 1, we have proven that asymptotically, with
high probability, each message subcodebook of the Mar-
ton coding scheme has approximately all un1 (m1, l1) and
un2 (m2, l2) sequences forming the preselected jointly typical
sequence pairs. This implies that the random components
in Marton coding L1 and L2 can play the role of random
components to confuse the eavesdropper. This in turn shows
that the Marton coding scheme alone is capable of providing
some basic message protection and the scheme achieves the
individual secrecy rate region R in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Using Marton coding, the following individual
secrecy rate region is achievable for the two-receiver discrete
memoryless broadcast channel with a passive eavesdropper:
R ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < I(U1;Y1)− I(U1;Z),
R2 < I(U2;Y2)− I(U2;Z),
R1 +R2 < I(U1;Y1) + I(U2;Y2)
− I(U1;U2),
R1 > I(U2;Z),
R2 > I(U1;Z),
R1 +R2 > I(U1;U2),
over all p(u1, u2)p(x|u1, u2)
subject to min{I(U1, Y1), I(U2, Y2)} >
I(U1, U2).

(8)
Sketch of proof for Theorem 2: We present a sketch of
proof here. Please refer to the extended version of this paper
[17, Appendix D] for the complete achievability proof. As a
consequence of Theorem 1, we need to satisfy the constraints
in (7) during codebook generation. The analysis of probability
of error in decoding and the analysis of individual secrecy
thereafter follow similar steps applied to Marton coding and
Wyner secrecy coding respectively. Combining all constraints
and performing the Fourier-Motzkin procedure will give us the
individual secrecy rate region R.
Remark 1: Our individual secrecy rate region in Theorem 2
imposes three lower bounds that seemingly bound the region
away from the R1 and R2 axes. However, we note that any
rate points that are potentially excluded due to these lower
bounds can be recovered by injecting additional randomness
to the transmitted messages, i.e., by taking M ′i = (Mi, Ti)
where Mi ∈ [1 : 2nRi ], Ti ∈ [1 : 2nRti ] and R′i = Ri + Rti,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the results in this paper shows that Marton cod-
ing [15] allows us to achieve message protection through indi-
vidual secrecy. Here, we once again emphasize that the random
components in Marton coding L1 and L2 can play a role in
message protection at the cost of two additional constraints
in (7). By satisfying these additional constraints, we can
guarantee that in each message subcodebook, approximately
all un1 (m1, l1) and u
n
2 (m2, l2) sequences form the preselected
jointly typical sequence pairs required by Marton coding. This
scenario provides us with sufficient un1 (m1, l1) and u
n
2 (m2, l2)
sequences which can act as random components to confuse the
eavesdropper even when the encoder has a strict encoding rule.
Our results provides us with an individual secrecy rate region
that is potentially larger than Chen, Koyluoglu and Sezgin [5]
and Mansour, Schaefer and Boche [7]. This can be observed
since the secrecy coding schemes of both Chen, Koyluoglu
and Sezgin and Mansour, Schaefer and Boche do not ensure
secure communication when reduced to our secrecy coding
scheme which comprises Marton coding only.
In addition, we provide an intuition that with Marton
coding alone, joint secrecy might not be achieved. The joint
secrecy notion requires the joint information leakage from both
message to the eavesdropper to be vanishing [11], [16]. This
requirement is difficult to be satisfied by Marton coding due
to the dependency between the Un1 and U
n
2 codewords.
In conclusion, the utilization of the Marton coding scheme
[15] to ensure individual secrecy is desirable since it may
help in reducing the need of implementing other secrecy
techniques. This reduces the complexity of coding schemes,
especially when we are dealing with channels with a large
number of receivers. It also opens the opportunity to derive
new secrecy coding schemes that performs better than existing
ones. Nonetheless, we will further investigate the ease of
implementation and compare the performance of this strategy
in future works.
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